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I. Introduction  
It is sometimes claimed that vertical mergers are inherently different from horizontal mergers 
because there is no elimination of a competitor.1  It similarly is said that there is no increase in 
market concentration, unlike a horizontal merger.2  In this comment, we question both of these 
claims.  We show that there in an inherent loss of an indirect competitor and competition when 
there is an input foreclosure concern.  We also show that it is possible to calculate an effective 
increase in the HHI measure of concentration for the downstream market, when the competitive 
concern is input foreclosure.  We refer to this “proxy” measure as the “dHHI.”  The dHHI (and 
associated post-merger HHI) can be used as potentially probative evidence in vertical merger 
matters.  In principle, these concentration measures also might be useful in the formation of safe 
harbors or anticompetitive presumptions for input foreclosure concerns, perhaps in conjunction 
with other evidence.  The draft Vertical Merger Guidelines (“VMGs”) suggest a safe harbor 
based on shares, not concentration.3 
We derive the dHHI measure by comparing the pricing incentives and associated upward pricing 
pressure (“UPP”) involved in two alternative types of acquisitions: (i) vertical mergers that raise 
                                                 
* The authors are Vice President and Director of Economic Modeling at Charles River Associates 
(Moresi); Professor of Economics and Law, Georgetown University Law Center, and Senior Consultant at 
Charles River Associates (Salop).  The analysis and opinions expressed here are our own and do not 
necessarily represent the views of our colleagues or consulting clients. 
1 See, e.g., D. Bruce Hoffman, Acting Director, Bureau of Competition, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Vertical 
Merger Enforcement at the FTC 3 (Jan. 10, 2018), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1304213/hoffman_vertical_merger_speec
h_final.pdf.  
2 United States v. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
3 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, DRAFT VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES, RELEASED 







unilateral input foreclosure concerns (and the associated vertical GUPPI measures),4 and (ii) 
horizontal acquisitions of partial ownership interests among competitors that raise unilateral 
effects concerns (and the associated modified GUPPI and modified HHI measures).5 
This connection between the vertical GUPPIs (“vGUPPIs”) for vertical mergers and the modified 
HHIs (“mHHIs”) for horizontal partial ownership transactions demonstrates the horizontal nature 
of the concern raised by potential input foreclosure in vertical mergers and how this horizontal 
concern is connected to the unilateral effects concern from horizontal mergers or horizontal 
partial ownership transactions.  The connection demonstrates that there is not an “inherent” 
difference in the competitive concerns, as is sometimes claimed.  The impact on pricing 
incentives and effective concentration from input foreclosure concerns is the same as the impact 
of an identifiable hypothetical horizontal consolidation involving partial ownership interests 
between the downstream merging firm and its potentially foreclosed rivals.   
The dHHI is based on the way in which the pricing incentives that arise in vertical mergers 
involving unilateral input foreclosure concerns are similar to the pricing incentives arising from 
partial ownership interests among competing firms.  It is derived analytically from consideration 
of two UPP measures—the vGUPPIs used to gauge unilateral input foreclosure effects and the 
modified GUPPIs (“mGUPPIs”) that are used to gauge unilateral price effects from partial 
ownership interests among horizontal competitors—and the associated mHHI concentration 
measure.  While our main focus here is the proxy dHHI measure, we also explain for 
completeness how a safe harbor or anticompetitive presumption might be based directly on the 
vGUPPIs themselves, and briefly discuss criticisms of the use of vGUPPIs for scoring the effects 
of vertical mergers on pricing incentives.   
We frame our basic formal analysis of input foreclosure in the context of a standard vertical 
industry model in which the upstream firms are Bertrand competitors selling differentiated inputs 
to downstream firms, and the downstream firms are Bertrand competitors selling differentiated 
substitute products to consumers.6  The vertically merged firm may have the incentive to engage 
                                                 
4 Serge Moresi & Steven. C. Salop, vGUPPI: Scoring Unilateral Pricing Incentives in Vertical Mergers, 
79 ANTITRUST L.J. 185 (2013).   
5 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 33 (2010) 
[hereinafter HMGs], https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review/100819hmg.pdf; 
Daniel P. O’Brien & Steve C. Salop, Competitive Effects of Partial Ownership: Financial Interest and 
Corporate Control, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 559 (2000); Andrea Asoni & Yianis Sarafidis, Economic Tools for 
Gauging the Competitive Effects of Partial Acquisitions in the Energy Sector, TRANSP., ENERGY & 
ANTITRUST, COMM. NEWSLETTER 3 (Summer 2017), 
http://www.crai.com/sites/default/files/publications/Economic-Tools-for-Gauging-the-Competitive-
Effects-of-Partial-Acquisitions-in-the-energy-sector.pdf. 
6 The model assumes for simplicity that there initially are no vertically integrated firms.  Each 
downstream firm sets the price of its product unilaterally, in the sense that it takes the prices charged by 
all the other firms as given.  Similarly, each upstream firm sets the prices of its input to the downstream 





in an input foreclosure strategy by raising the price of the input charged to one or several 
targeted downstream rivals.  In extreme cases, the merged firm may have the incentive to raise 
the input price to a prohibitively high level that totally forecloses the (targeted) downstream 
rivals from access to its input.  Such partial or total input foreclosure can be profitable to the 
merged firm because it can raise the costs faced by the downstream rivals, and hence can lead to 
diversion of sales from the downstream rivals to the downstream merging firm.  It 
simultaneously can lead the downstream rivals to raise prices to consumers, which then can 
allow the downstream merging firm to increase its price, its market share or some combination of 
the two.7     
At the outset, we want to emphasize several features of the dHHI and vGUPPI measures as well 
as some associated caveats and limitations. 
First, we recognize that the dHHI measure is limited only to the downstream market, so it may 
need to be combined with the level of concentration for the upstream market (or the supply of the 
input by the upstream merging firm to firms in the downstream market8).  Its accuracy also is 
subject to limitations, just as are concentration measures used for horizontal mergers.  However, 
the dHHI has some intuitive properties that can make it a useful addition to the antitrust toolkit. 
Second, our formal model focuses on the effects of a vertical merger on unilateral incentives to 
engage in input foreclosure, and examines only “first round” effects.  Input foreclosure conduct 
likely also would lead to pricing effects by rival firms at either level of the vertical supply chain.  
Total foreclosure or price increases by the upstream merging firm may lead its competitors to 
                                                 
account that raising the price of its input to a given downstream firm will induce that downstream firm to 
increase its downstream price in response.  See Roman Inderst & Tommaso Valletti, Incentives for Input 
Foreclosure, 55 EUR. ECON. REV. 820 (2011); Moresi & Salop, supra note 4.  Other models assume that 
each upstream firm negotiates bilaterally with each downstream firm over the price of the input.  See, e.g., 
Patrick Rey & Thibaud Vergé, Secret Contracting in Multilateral Relations (Nov. 26, 2019, 
https://www.tse-fr.eu/sites/default/files/TSE/documents/doc/by/rey/secret.pdf; Serge Moresi, Vertical 
Mergers and Bargaining Models: Simultaneous versus Sequential Pricing (Feb. 19, 2020), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3541099.  
7 The input foreclosure also could lead to accommodating responses either by the upstream rivals of the 
merged firm (they also would increase their input prices to the targeted downstream rivals) or by the non-
targeted downstream rivals (they also would increase their output prices to consumers).  These 
accommodating responses would exacerbate the anticompetitive effects of input foreclosure.  Thomas G. 
Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power 
over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986); Janusz A. Ordover, Garth Saloner & Steven C. Salop, Equilibrium 
Vertical Foreclosure, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 127 (1990). 
8 See draft VMGs, supra note 3, at 2 (“Example 1: A retail chain buys a manufacturer of cleaning 
products.  In this example, the Agencies may identify two relevant markets.  The first potential relevant 
market is the supply of cleaning products to retail customers in a given geographic area.  For this relevant 






respond with accommodating price increases of their own.  These price increases might be 
unilateral (or more strictly, multilateral) or they may be coordinated.9  At the downstream level, 
input foreclosure may raise the costs of a maverick competitor, which could facilitate 
coordination at that level.10  While coordination can play a role in input foreclosure, we are not 
explicitly taking account of coordinated effects theories of harm in the formal model.  The dHHI 
(like the vGUPPIs) does not take any of these possibilities into account.  However, we will 
discuss the role of coordinated conduct outside the formal model.   
Third, we are focusing on input foreclosure, not customer foreclosure.  While the analysis of 
customer foreclosure is analogous, it also differs in some ways.  It typically involves reducing 
rivals’ revenues instead or in addition to increasing rivals’ costs.  The dHHI (like the vGUPPIs) 
is not derived here with an eye towards customer foreclosure.11   
Fourth, because we are focusing on concentration (and its possible use as a safe harbor screen or 
anticompetitive presumption), we will not take into account any merger-specific elimination of 
double marginalization (“EDM”) or other cognizable efficiencies.  This is the same approach 
taken for horizontal mergers.  Of course, any cognizable efficiencies would be analyzed if the 
merger is investigated further.   
The remainder of this comment is organized as follows.  In Section II, we show how the 
vertically merging firms are “indirect competitors” in the pre-merger world and how the merger 
is a like a horizontal consolidation that eliminates this indirect competition.  In Section III, we 
derive the dHHI to proxy for the increase in effective concentration in the downstream market 
and explain how it can be measured in practice.  The dHHI is based on vGUPPIs, the 
relationship between vertical and horizontal GUPPIs, and the mHHI for horizontal acquisitions 
of partial ownership interests.  In Section IV, we discuss how the dHHI can be used in practice to 
form a general indicator (like the delta HHI in horizontal mergers), a safe harbor, or an 
                                                 
9 We assume unilateral conduct pre-merger.  Intuitively, if pre-merger the upstream merging firm were to 
raise its input prices to downstream firms, the other upstream firms would not match the price increase 
because they would anticipate that the upstream merging firm likely would then “cheat” and reduce price.  
So, upstream coordination does not occur pre-merger.  Post-merger, however, upstream coordination 
targeted at the rivals of the downstream merging firm is more likely to occur than pre-merger.  The reason 
is that the upstream merging firm would have a weaker incentive to “cheat” since reducing its input prices 
to downstream rivals would reduce the downstream profit earned by the downstream merging firm.  
10 Downstream coordination increases the profit of the downstream merging firm, but reduces the profit 
that the upstream merging firm earns from sales to downstream rivals.  It is possible that the overall effect 
of downstream coordination would be to increase the total profits of the merged firm. 
11 It is the case that customer foreclosure can lead to input foreclosure.  For example, suppose customer 
foreclosure leads a targeted upstream rival or rivals to lose substantial sales and this raises their marginal 
costs or leads to exit.  As a result, the upstream merging firm (and its remaining competitors) may gain 
the power to raise input prices to the rivals of the downstream firm, either unilaterally or through 
coordinated action.  This input foreclosure then could raise the costs of the downstream rivals and harm 




anticompetitive presumption.  In Section V, we briefly explain that the vGUPPIs themselves 
could be used instead of the dHHI, address some criticisms that have been made of the vGUPPI 
methodology in two recent working papers, and derive simultaneous vGUPPIs in response.  
Section VI concludes. 
II. Are the Potential Competitive Effects of Vertical Mergers Inherently Different from 
Horizontal Mergers? 
While there is no increase in the nominal level of concentration in the downstream market from a 
vertical merger, our analysis shows that there is a loss of an indirect competitor and therefore an 
increase in effective concentration in the downstream market.  We also show how to derive a 
proxy dHHI measure for the increase in effective concentration.  These two ideas of indirect 
competition and effective concentration flow from the same economic analysis.   
We derive the dHHI measure by comparing the vGUPPIs for vertical mergers that raise 
unilateral input foreclosure concerns and the mGUPPIs for horizontal acquisitions of partial 
ownership interests among competitors that raise unilateral effects concerns.  Specifically, we 
show that the effects on pricing incentives from a vertical merger are identical to the effects on 
pricing incentives from a particular hypothetical transaction involving partial ownership interests 
among the downstream firms (in the sense that the mGUPPIs would be equal to the vGUPPIs).  
We then define the dHHI as equal to the increase in the mHHI from the equivalent hypothetical 
horizontal transactions. 
These connections between the vGUPPIs and the mHHIs for partial ownership transactions 
demonstrate the horizontal nature of the concern raised by input foreclosure in vertical mergers 
and how this horizontal concern can be related to the unilateral effects concern from horizontal 
mergers or horizontal partial ownership transactions.  The connections also demonstrate that the 
underlying economic analysis does not involve an “inherent” difference in competitive concerns.  
This latter property is derived in the formal model to follow.   
To understand at an intuitive level the relationship between the competitive concerns of the two 
types of mergers, a useful starting point is the claim that a vertical merger does not inherently 
eliminate a competitor or competition, unlike a horizontal merger.  While this observation might 
appear to apply in a superficial sense, economic analysis of input foreclosure shows why it is not 
economically correct.  The error is that the claim ignores the fact that in the pre-merger market, 
the (future) upstream merging firm is an “indirect competitor” of the (future) downstream 
merging firm.  This is because the upstream firm sells inputs to the competitors of the (future) 
downstream merger partner, and therefore has a role in “supporting” competition in the 
downstream market by rivals of its (future) downstream merger partner.  In this sense, the 
(future) upstream merging firm has some “indirect control” over the ability of the downstream 
rivals to compete with the (future) downstream merging firm.  By providing inputs to these rivals 
(in competition with other upstream firms), the upstream firm facilitates and increases 




However, the vertical merger changes these incentives.  After the merger, the upstream merging 
firm has a unilateral incentive to reduce its support of the downstream competitors and 
competition.  That is because the merger leads the upstream merging firm to take account of the 
fact that raising input prices to the rivals of the downstream merging firm leads to diversion of 
downstream sales from the rivals to the downstream merging firm.  For this reason, there is an 
inherent horizontal element to a vertical merger that might lead to anticompetitive effects of 
input foreclosure.   
To illustrate, suppose that the upstream merging firm is supplying inputs in the pre-merger 
market to some rivals of the downstream merging firm.  Assume further that the downstream 
firms are unable to engage in any substitution by purchasing inputs from other upstream firms.12  
By raising its input prices to these downstream firms, the upstream firm raises the costs of these 
rivals, which allows the upstream firm effectively to have some indirect control over the 
production and pricing incentives of these downstream rivals.13  Thus, the vertical merger would 
allow the merged firm to raise rivals’ costs in the downstream market, thereby possibly creating 
incentives for each of these targeted rivals to raise their own downstream prices.   
This raises the question of whether the merged firm would have the incentive to do so.  In the 
pre-merger market equilibrium, the upstream merging firm has no incentive to raise its input 
prices to rivals of the downstream merging firm, because the upstream merging firm in the pre-
merger world ignores the benefits accruing to the downstream merging firm if its rivals raise 
their prices.  After the merger, however, the merged firm will not ignore and instead will fully 
internalize the benefits obtained by its downstream division when the targeted rivals raise their 
prices or reduce their output (following a targeted input price increase by the upstream firm).  It 
is in this sense that the vertical merger creates a type of indirect horizontal consolidation 
between the downstream merging firm and the foreclosed rival firms.   
The merged firm also will have an incentive to increase prices to consumers because it will take 
account of the fact that an increase in the prices charged to consumers by its downstream 
division would cause diversion of sales to downstream rivals, who then would purchase more 
                                                 
12 Even here, the incentives to raise input prices to these downstream firms would be limited by a number 
of factors, including (i) the pass-through of the input price increases into the output prices of these 
downstream firms, (ii) downstream competition from firms that do not purchase inputs from the upstream 
merging firm, and (iii) the elasticity of demand in the downstream market. 
13 The upstream merging firm does not exert direct control over the production and pricing decisions of 
the firms that it supplies (as it would if it owned those firms) but instead it controls them indirectly 





inputs from the upstream merging firm.14  This is another inherent horizontal effect.15  
Intuitively, from the perspective of the downstream merging firm, the upstream merging firm has 
a “financial interest” in each downstream rival to which it sells inputs; when the rival sells an 
additional unit to consumers, the upstream merging firm obtains a “dividend” equal to the 
upstream merging firm’s margin on input sales to that rival.  Through the vertical merger, 
therefore, the downstream merging firm acquires a “financial interest” in each rival supplied by 
the upstream merging firm.  To illustrate, suppose that a rival of the downstream merging firm 
purchases one unit of input from the upstream merging firm for each unit of output that it 
produces.  Suppose further that the dollar margins of the rival and the upstream merging firm are 
equal.  Then, the vertical merger would have the same effect on the pricing incentives of the 
downstream merging firm as a hypothetical horizontal merger between the downstream merging 
firm and the rival.  If the dollar margin of the upstream merging firm is smaller than the dollar 
margin of the downstream rival, the equivalent hypothetical horizontal transaction would be the 
acquisition of a partial ownership interest in the rival, and not a full merger.  This inherent 
horizontal effect (from the upstream merging firm having a “financial interest” in downstream 
rivals) is distinct from and in addition to the inherent horizontal effect (from the upstream 
merging firm having “indirect control” over downstream rivals) discussed in the previous 
paragraphs. 
While the vertical merger has these two inherent horizontal effects, these effects are not 
equivalent to a horizontal merger.  Instead, as we show in our model, they are more closely 
related to partial ownership transactions among the downstream competitors.  It is for this reason 
that the dHHI proxy measure for vertical mergers is based on the mHHI measure used for 
horizontal partial ownership transactions. 
III. The dHHI for Proxying the Increase in Effective Concentration in the Downstream 
Market 
The dHHI measure is based on two simultaneous, hypothetical partial ownership transactions 
that would create the same effects on pricing incentives as the vertical merger.  In one 
hypothetical transaction, each of the rivals that would be targeted for input foreclosure obtains a 
silent (that is, passive, non-voting) partial financial interest in the downstream merging firm.  In 
the other hypothetical transaction, the downstream merging firm acquires a silent partial 
financial interest in each of its rivals that purchase the input of the upstream merging firm.  The 
                                                 
14 As indicated previously, we do not take into account any merger-specific EDM or other cognizable 
efficiencies at this stage of the analysis.  As with horizontal mergers, any cognizable efficiencies would 
be analyzed if the merger is investigated further. 
15 The draft VMGs recognize this effect.  See draft VMGs, supra note 3, §6.  See also Yongmin Chen, On 





dHHI is equal to the increase in the mHHI from both of these hypothetical horizontal 
transactions taken together.16   
A. Hypothetical Horizontal Transaction to Capture the UPP of the Targeted 
Downstream Rivals  
The driving force of our analysis is that the merging firms may be indirect competitors in the 
pre-merger market.  If an upstream firm is supplying inputs to the rivals of a downstream firm, 
that upstream firm is in effect supporting competition in the downstream market by the rivals of  
that downstream firm.  It is in this sense that the upstream merging firm is an indirect competitor 
of the downstream merging firm in the pre-merger market. 
The vertical merger specifically may reduce or eliminate the incentives of the upstream merging 
firm to support the competition from the rivals of the downstream merging firm.  The vertical 
merger thus creates a type of indirect horizontal consolidation between the downstream merging 
firm and each foreclosed rival firm.  The dHHI concept is a way to capture this consolidation 
with a concentration measure based on the analysis of the incentive effects of partial ownership 
interests among competitors.  More precisely, instead of thinking about a targeted downstream 
rival as having an incentive to raise its price because the upstream merging firm raised the input 
price to that rival, we proxy for this effect by determining that rival’s identical incentive to raise 
price “as if” it had acquired a silent partial financial interest in the downstream merging firm.  
This equivalent hypothetical horizontal partial ownership transaction is a useful way to look at 
the potential effect of the vertical merger on the targeted downstream rival.  If there are multiple 
downstream firms targeted for input foreclosure, then there will be additional such hypothetical 
horizontal transactions.  The incentive effect of these hypothetical horizontal transactions can be 
gauged as an increase in the mHHI of the downstream market.17  The dHHI measure then is 
defined as the increase in the mHHI resulting from these equivalent hypothetical horizontal 
transactions (and from the other transactions discussed in Section III.B below).   
In our vGUPPI article,18 we gauge the resulting effect on the pricing incentives of the foreclosed 
rival(s) with the vGUPPIr measure.19  We next briefly review this measure and then explain how 
we derive the hypothetical, equivalent horizontal transaction and the corresponding increase in 
the mHHI.  
                                                 
16 For input foreclosure, the draft VMGs formally define only a downstream market, using the same 
market definition methodology as in the HMGs.  See draft VMGs, supra note 3, §2.  In addition, the draft 
VMGs define an upstream “related product.”  Id. at Examples 1 and 2.  
17 O’Brien & Salop, supra note 5. 
18 Moresi & Salop, supra note 4. 







An increase in the input price that the upstream merging firm charges to a downstream rival 
targeted for input foreclosure would raise the marginal cost of production of the rival, which 
would give the rival an incentive to raise its own price.  This mechanism suggests the relevance 
of the upward pricing incentives of the downstream rival whose costs would be raised post-
merger.  The vGUPPIr translates the merged firm’s incentive to raise the input price it charges to 
a foreclosed downstream rival into the resulting impact on the incentive of the foreclosed rival to 
raise its output price.  Formally,20 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	  (1) 
where PTRU denotes the cost pass-through rate of the upstream merging firm, DRRD denotes the 
diversion ratio from the foreclosed rival to the downstream merging firm, MD denotes the 
percentage margin earned by the downstream merging firm, and PD / PR denotes the ratio of the 
prices charged to consumers by the downstream merging firm and the foreclosed rival.   
2. The Equivalent Hypothetical Horizontal Transaction 
As explained above, a key point of our approach is that input foreclosure reduces the intensity of 
competition that the downstream merging firm faces from the foreclosed rivals.  This creates a 
horizontal effect that is analogous to the reduction in the intensity of competition that would 
occur if instead of a vertical merger, each targeted rival were to behave “as if” it had acquired a 
silent partial ownership interest (BRD) in the downstream merging firm.  The effect of such 
hypothetical, horizontal partial acquisition on a rival’s pricing incentives is gauged by the 
horizontal mGUPPIr.  Formally,21  
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	  (2) 
where BRD denotes the hypothetical, silent ownership share obtained by the (foreclosed) rival in 
the downstream merging firm.  Note that the factor DRRD × MD × PD / PR in equation (2) is the 
                                                 
20 As discussed above, we assume no input substitution.  If input substitution is possible, the vGUPPIr is 
smaller and requires additional information.  The assumption of no input substitution is appropriate for 
our purpose of measuring a potential increase in effective concentration in the downstream market.  We 
discuss this issue in more detail in Section IV.B.  





standard horizontal GUPPI of the rival for a hypothetical merger with the downstream merging 
firm. 
Comparing equations (1) and (2), the vertical merger creates UPP on a foreclosed rival that is 
identical to the UPP that would be created if the rival were to acquire a silent ownership share 
equal to the cost pass-through rate of the upstream merging firm (i.e., BRD = PTRU).22  Thus, this 
is the equivalent hypothetical partial ownership transaction. 
For example, suppose that the cost pass-through rate is equal to 50%.23  Then, for each 
foreclosed rival, the UPP is identical to that from a hypothetical acquisition by the rival of a 50% 
silent ownership share in the downstream merging firm.  If there are multiple rivals that would 
be foreclosed with input price increases, then each of them would behave “as if” it had obtained 
a 50% silent ownership share in the downstream merging firm.24  The effects of each of these 
hypothetical transactions involving the targeted downstream rivals would need to be summed up 
to evaluate the total competitive effect.25   
3. Contribution to the dHHI in the Downstream Market 
This UPP analysis thus shows how the impact of potential input foreclosure on the pricing 
incentives of targeted downstream rivals can be reckoned into a dHHI calculation.  The 
contribution of the vGUPPIr to the dHHI can be measured with the increase in the mHHI from 
the equivalent hypothetical partial ownership transactions.  The mHHI formulation is the 
following: if Firm-A acquires a silent partial ownership share β in Firm-B, the mHHI rises by the 
magnitude β x SA x SB, where SA and SB are the market shares of the two firms.26  The following 
examples show how this can be applied to input foreclosure. 
Example: Consider a downstream market with five firms and assume that 
each has a 20% market share.  Suppose that the merged firm would be able 
to target for input foreclosure only one of the four downstream rivals.  The 
contribution to the dHHI in the downstream market can be calculated from 
the increase in the mHHI from a 50% silent financial interest transaction.  
                                                 
22 BRD = PTRU is obtained by setting (1) equal to (2) and solving for BRD. 
23 A cost pass-through rate of 50% is consistent with linear demand.  Carl Shapiro suggested the use of a 
50% pass-through rate as the default rate for horizontal GUPPIs.  Carl Shapiro, The 2010 Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines: From Hedgehog to Fox in 40 Years, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 701, 750 (2010).   
24 Each foreclosed rival would have a vGUPPIr.  See Moresi & Salop, supra note 4, at 200. 
25 Our analysis uses hypothetical horizontal transactions, not actual horizontal transactions, to proxy for 
the pricing incentive effects of a vertical merger.  For example, the fact that (say) three targeted rivals 
might behave “as if” each had a 50% ownership share in the downstream merging firm does not mean that 
real world ownership shares add up to 150%.  Therefore, it does not imply that the increase in effective 
concentration is overstated.     




Applying the mHHI formula, the increase in effective concentration in the 
downstream market, as measured by the mHHI, is equal to 200 (i.e., 0.5 x 20 
x 20).   
Example: Suppose instead that the upstream merging firm has two 
downstream customers that it fully supplies and targets both of them for input 
foreclosure.  In this case, the increase in effective concentration is equal to 
400 (i.e., 2 x 0.5 x 20 x 20).   
This contribution to the dHHI arises from the impact of input foreclosure on the incentives of the 
foreclosed downstream rivals.  We turn next to the analysis of the impact of the vertical merger 
on the incentives of the downstream merging firm. 
B. Hypothetical Horizontal Transaction to Capture the UPP of the Downstream 
Merging Firm 
A vertical merger also changes the incentives of the downstream merging firm.  The vertical 
merger reduces the incentive of the downstream merging firm to compete against rivals that are 
customers of the upstream merging firm.27  This is another way in which merging firms may be 
seen as indirect competitors in the pre-merger market.  Suppose that the upstream merging firm 
is supplying inputs in the pre-merger market to some rivals of the downstream merging firm.  
For simplicity, assume further that the downstream merging firm is not a customer of the 
upstream merging firm.28  By unilaterally raising its output price, the downstream merging firm 
will lose some sales, and a fraction of the lost sales will be captured by (i.e., diverted to) rival 
downstream firms, including those rivals that are customers of the upstream merging firm.  It 
follows that the vertical merger would incentivize the downstream merging firm to raise its 
output price because doing so would increase the input sales made by the upstream merging firm 
to the downstream rivals.  In the pre-merger market equilibrium, the downstream merging firm 
has no incentive to raise its output price to gain this effect.  This is because the pre-merger 
downstream merging firm would have no reason to take into account any benefit received by the 
future upstream merger partner.  Post-merger, however, the merged firm will have the incentive 
to internalize the benefit obtained by its upstream division when the downstream division raises 
its output price.   
The vertical merger creates a type of indirect horizontal consolidation between the downstream 
merging firm and the rival firms that are customers of the upstream merging firm.  As we 
discussed above, we proxy for this vertical merger effect by considering that the downstream 
merging firm has an identical incentive to raise price “as if” it had acquired a silent partial 
                                                 
27 Chen, supra note 15.      
28 In this simple example, there cannot be any EDM since the downstream merging firm is not a customer 
of the upstream merging firm.  Because we are focusing solely on a measure of effective concentration,  




financial interest in each of its rivals that are customers of the upstream merging firm.  This 
equivalent hypothetical horizontal transaction is a useful way to gauge the effect of vertical 
merger on the pricing incentives of the downstream merging firm because it corresponds to an 
increase in the mHHI of the downstream market.   
The driving force of the partial ownership analogy here is that an increase in the price of the 
downstream merging firm resulting from the vertical merger will cause diversion to other 
downstream competitors, just as diversion would occur if the downstream merging firm raised its 
price after acquiring a partial ownership interest in one or more of its competitors. 
In our vGUPPI article, we gauged this effect on the pricing incentives of the downstream 
merging firm with the vGUPPId measure.  We next briefly review this measure and then explain 
how we derive the hypothetical, equivalent horizontal transaction and the corresponding increase 
in the mHHI.   
Before doing so, however, we want to point out that this UPP effect on the downstream merging 
firms occurs whether or not these rivals are foreclosed by the upstream merging firm.29  It is a 
more general effect.  In a full competitive effects analysis, it would mitigate or even reverse the 
downward pricing pressure from merger-specific EDM.   
1. vGUPPId 
The vGUPPId gauges the post-merger UPP on the output price of the downstream merging firm. 
It specifically gauges the UPP resulting from the fact that the merger leads the downstream 
merging firm to reckon into its incentives the impact of its potential price increase on the profits 
that the upstream merging firm earns from sales to downstream rivals.  Because we are focusing 
on a dHHI concept corresponding to the approach of the HMGs, the appropriate vGUPPId 
measure does not include any potential impact on pricing incentives of merger-specific EDM or 
other efficiencies.30   
The basic equation for the vGUPPId is written as follows:31 
                                                 
29 Furthermore, this UPP effect—that the downstream division of the merged firm will have an incentive 
to compete less aggressively in the downstream market if a rival is also a customer of the upstream 
division—may induce the rival to continue to purchase the input from the upstream division, even if it 
could obtain the input at a lower price from a different supplier.  This is because switching to a different 
supplier would intensify competition from the merged firm.  Chen, supra note 15.     
30 Our vGUPPI article discusses two other vGUPPId measures that do take account of any merger-specific 
EDM.  Moresi & Salop, supra note 4.  These would be incorporated into a full competitive effects 
analysis, albeit not a safe harbor analysis before it is known whether the EDM is likely to occur or is 
merger-specific.  See draft VMGs, supra note 3, §6.  
31 We are using equation (A14) of the technical appendix of our vGUPPI article, with the convention that 
one unit of output requires one unit of the input under consideration (i.e., Ak =1).  That is different from 





	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	  (3) 
where DRDR denotes the diversion ratio from the downstream merging firm to a given rival, SUR 
denotes the upstream merging firm’s share of that rival’s input purchases, WUR and MUR denote 
the upstream merging firm’s price and percentage margin for input sales to that rival, and PD 
denotes the downstream merger partner’s output price.32  We consider the diversion to each rival 
separately and, therefore, the total effect is found by aggregating across all rivals. 
As explained above, it is important to recognize that vGUPPId measures only a first-round effect 
and fails to take account of a number of important feedback effects.  The vGUPPId specifically 
holds constant the input prices of the upstream merging firm at the pre-merger level, and thus 
holds constant both the upstream merging firm’s dollar margin (i.e., MUR × WUR in equation (3)) 
and the upstream merging firm’s share of the rival’s input purchases (i.e., SUR in equation (3)).  
Thus, vGUPPId scores only the first-round incentive to raise the output price of the downstream 
merging firm before there are any increases in the input price charged to any foreclosed 
downstream rivals.  Specifically, it does not take account of the impact of raising rivals’ costs on 
the pricing incentives of the downstream merging firm.33  Nor does it take account of the impact 
of raising rivals’ costs on the pricing incentives of the competing upstream firms and of the 
competing downstream firms that are not foreclosed.  In a full merger analysis, all those 
feedback effects would be taken into account. 
2. The Equivalent Hypothetical Horizontal Transaction 
The vertical merger creates UPP on the output price of the downstream merging firm.  This 
creates a horizontal effect that is analogous to the effect that would occur if there were no 
vertical merger but the downstream merging firm instead were to behave “as if” it had acquired a 
silent partial ownership interest in each downstream rival that purchases inputs from the 
upstream merging firm.  The effect of such hypothetical, horizontal partial acquisition on the 
downstream merging firm’s pricing incentives is gauged by the horizontal mGUPPId.  Formally, 
                                                 
explicitly in the formula (as it is accounted for in the calculation of the input “price” or input cost per unit 
of output).  
32 This incentive to raise the price of the downstream merging firm can be explained as follows.  If the 
downstream merging firm raises its price, a fraction of its lost sales (DRDR) will be diverted to the 
downstream rival under consideration.  However, that rival may use the upstream merging firm for a 
share (SUR) of its input purchases, in which case the upstream merging firm gains incremental sales (DRDR 
× SUR) and earns a dollar margin (MUR × WUR) on each incremental sale.  Normalizing this effect as a 
percentage of the output price of the downstream merging firm (PD) yields equation (3). 
33 Similarly, the previous analysis of the pricing incentives of the upstream merging firm did not take 
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where BDR denotes the hypothetical, silent ownership share obtained by the downstream merging 
firm in the rival under consideration, and MR denotes that rival’s percentage margin.  Note that 
the factor DRDR × MR × PR / PD in equation (4) is the standard horizontal GUPPI of the 
downstream merging firm for a hypothetical merger with that rival.   
Comparing equations (3) and (4), it follows that the vertical merger creates UPP on the 
downstream merging firm that is identical to the UPP that would be created if the downstream 
merging firm instead were to acquire a silent ownership share in that rival equal to:34 
	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	
 (5) 
In words, this equivalent ownership share is equal to the upstream merging firm’s share of the 
downstream rival’s input purchases (SUR ) multiplied by the upstream merging firm’s dollar 
margin on input sales made to that rival (MUR × WUR) and divided by the rival’s dollar margin 
(MR × PR).   
For example, suppose that the ratio of the upstream to downstream dollar margins is 0.3, and 
consider a downstream rival that purchases exclusively from the upstream merging firm, that is, 
SUR = 100%.  Then, diversion to that rival creates UPP on the downstream merging firm that is 
identical to that from a hypothetical acquisition by the downstream merging firm of a 30% (i.e., 
100% x 0.30) silent financial ownership share in that rival.  If there are multiple rivals that are 
customers of the upstream merging firm, then there are additional effects that must similarly be 
taken into account and added together to obtain the total effect on the mHHI.    
The effect of the vertical merger on the downstream merging firm’s pricing incentives (ignoring 
EDM) thus is the same as the effect on incentives from a horizontal partial ownership acquisition 
by the downstream merging firm of each foreclosed downstream rival, where the partial interest 
is a share BDR that account for the upstream merging firm’s share of the downstream rival’s input  
purchases and the fact that the upstream merging firm’s dollar margin is typically only a fraction 
of the downstream rival’s dollar margin.   
3. Contribution to the dHHI in the Downstream Market 
This analysis thus shows how the impact of UPP on the downstream merging firm (created by 
the vertical merger) can be reckoned into a dHHI calculation.  The dHHI contribution of the 
                                                 




vGUPPId can be measured by the increase in the mHHI of the equivalent hypothetical partial 
ownership transactions.  The following examples show how this is calculated. 
Example: Consider again the previous example with five symmetric 
downstream firms that each have 20% market share.  Suppose that the 
upstream merging firm supplies 100% of the input needs of a single 
downstream rival and that this one downstream rival is the only customer of 
the merged firm. Suppose that the dollar margin ratio (of the upstream 
merging firm to that rival) is 0.3.  In this example, the increase in effective 
concentration in the downstream market, as measured by the mHHI, is equal 
to 120 (i.e., 0.3 x 20 x 20).   
Example: Suppose instead that the upstream merging firm supplies 100% of 
the input needs of two downstream rivals and these downstream rivals are the 
only two customers of the merged firm, and the dollar margin ratio is 0.3.  
The increase in effective concentration now is equal to 240 (i.e., 2 x 0.3 x 20 
x 20).35   
The increases in the mHHI for these examples reflect only the UPP on the downstream merging 
firm’s output price.  The dHHI measure must account for that UPP as well as the UPP on the 
foreclosed rivals’ prices, as discussed next.  Before doing so, it is useful to repeat that the 
incentive of the downstream merging firm to raise price in order to drive additional sales to the 
upstream merging firm occurs even if there is no foreclosure concern.  This can lead to a large  
dHHI even if there are no foreclosure concerns, which could be relevant to enforcement if 
merger-specific EDM is small or non-existent.36 
C. The dHHI  
The previous sections described two types of hypothetical horizontal transactions that together 
can be used to proxy for a vertical merger that raises input foreclosure concerns, and hence 
evaluate the merger’s impact on effective concentration in the downstream market.  These two 
hypothetical transactions involve several partial ownership interests among the downstream 
                                                 
35 If instead there are two downstream customers but each one purchases only 50% of its input purchases 
from the upstream merging firm, then the increase in effective concentration is equal to 120 (that is, 2 × 
0.5 × 0.3 × 20 × 20). 
36 If there are no foreclosure concerns and the downstream firms are not symmetric, then the UPP may 
outweigh the EDM of the downstream merging firm when the pre-merger world satisfies some or all of 
the following properties: (a) the downstream merging firm buys fewer inputs from the upstream merging 
firm than its rivals do; (b) the upstream merging firm earns a lower dollar margin on input sales to the 
downstream merging firm than it earns on input sales to rival downstream firms; (c) downstream market 
demand is sufficiently inelastic; and (d) the downstream merging firm has little ability to substitute inputs 
from rival suppliers with inputs from the upstream merging firm.  However, if there are no foreclosure 
concerns, then the EDM outweighs the UPP of the downstream merging firm when the downstream firms 




firms, which then can be combined in order to evaluate their total impact on the effective level of 
concentration in the downstream market.  The dHHI measures that total impact.      
The dHHI specifically is equal to the sum of the individual dHHIs from each of these proxy 
transactions, that is, (i) each of the foreclosed rivals acquiring a silent financial interest  
BRD = PTRU in the downstream merging firm, and (ii) the downstream merging firm acquiring a 
silent financial interest BDR = SUR × MUR × WUR / (MR × PR) in each rival that purchases the input 
of the upstream merging firm.  Applying this formula to the two types of hypothetical 
transactions, we obtain the total increase in the dHHI, 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 SUR ×	
MUR × WUR
MR ×	PRR
 ×	SR ×	SD (6) 
where SD denotes the market share of the downstream merging firm, SF denotes the total market 
share of foreclosed rivals in the downstream market, and SR is the market share of an individual 
rival of the downstream merging firm.  Note that the last term in equation (6) is a summation 
over all the rivals of the downstream merging firm.   
Consider again the case where all the rivals of the downstream merging firm are similarly 
situated in that they all procure the same share  of their input needs from the upstream 
merging firm, and they all have the same margin ratio MUR × WUR / (MR × PR).  If they all are 
potential targets for input foreclosure, then the above dHHI becomes 
	 	 	 	 	
MUR × WUR
MR ×	PR
	 	 	S  ×	 	1	 	 	  (7) 
This expression can be used to measure the increase in effective concentration in the downstream 
market that results from a vertical merger that raises input foreclosure concerns.   
The dHHI calculation can be illustrated by combining the two parts of the previous numerical 
examples, where we assume PTRu = 50%, MUR × WUR / (MR × PR) = 0.3, and SD = 20%.  
Example: Suppose only one downstream rival is customer of the upstream 
merging firm and purchases the input exclusively from the upstream merging 
firm (that is,	 100%), and this customer is targeted for input 
foreclosure.  Thus, dHHI = (0.5 + 0.3) × 20 × 20 = 320.  This is the sum of 
the dHHI contribution of 200 from the transaction equivalent to the vGUPPIr 
and a contribution of 120 from the transaction equivalent to the vGUPPId.    
Example: Suppose instead that two downstream rivals are fully supplied by 
the upstream merging firm and are potentially targeted for input foreclosure.  




from the transaction equivalent to the vGUPPIr and 240 from the transaction 
equivalent to the vGUPPId.  
These examples indicate the need to identify the set of downstream rivals that might be targeted 
for input foreclosure by the merged firm.  All the rivals must be identified in order to obtain an 
accurate dHHI measure.  
IV. Applying the dHHI in Vertical Merger Analysis 
The dHHI and the associated post-merger HHI levels have several possible roles in vertical 
merger analysis.  They can be used as a rough gauge of competitive concerns in vertical mergers 
involving potential input foreclosure.  They also in principle might be useful in forming a safe 
harbor screen or a concentration-based anticompetitive presumption for vertical mergers that 
raise input foreclosure concerns, possibly along with other evidence.  
A. The Role of the dHHI 
The dHHI can be used as an initial, rough gauge of the competitive concerns from a vertical 
merger that involves potential input foreclosure.  The dHHI only measures first-round effects on 
pricing incentives, just as do the standard GUPPIs used in horizontal merger analysis.  Focusing 
on these first-round effects, a higher dHHI suggests greater anticompetitive concerns.   
These first-round effects on pricing incentives specifically exclude the following feedback 
effects.   
First, the first-round effects do not take into account the impact of the pricing incentives of the 
targeted rivals (following input foreclosure) on the pricing incentives of the downstream merging 
firm.  Nor do they take into account the impact of the pricing incentives of the downstream 
merging firm on the pricing incentives of the targeted rivals.  These feedback effects could 
exacerbate the competitive harms, just as is the case for horizontal mergers.  In Section V, we 
show how simultaneous effects on pricing incentives can be calculated, just as they can for 
horizontal GUPPIs.37 
Second, the first-round effects assume that non-targeted downstream firms do not change their 
prices in response to the foreclosure of the targeted downstream rivals.  Since the foreclosed 
rivals will have the incentive to raise their prices, these non-targeted competitors would tend to 
have the incentive to respond by raising their prices.  This also creates feedback effects among 
                                                 
37 The simultaneous GUPPIs for horizontal mergers are equal to the compensating marginal cost 
reductions (“CMCRs”) expressed as a percentage of price.  Gregory J. Werden, A Robust Test for 
Consumer Welfare Enhancing Mergers Among Sellers of Differentiated Products, 44 J. INDUS. ECON. 409 
(1996).  The corresponding price increases also can be calculated if one assumes linear demand.  Jerry 
Hausman, Serge Moresi & Mark Rainey, Unilateral Effects of Mergers with General Linear Demand, 111 




the price increases that could exacerbate the competitive harms further, just as it occurs for 
horizontal mergers.  
Third, the first-round effects do not take into account possible entry or repositioning by 
competing upstream firms or non-targeted downstream firms.  Nor do they take into account 
possible repositioning by the upstream and downstream divisions of the merged firm.  These 
effects could mitigate or offset the competitive harms, just as is the case for horizontal mergers. 
Fourth, the first-round effects taken into account in the dHHI do not include any downward 
pricing pressure from cognizable efficiency benefits, including EDM.  These effects would 
mitigate or offset the competitive harms, if they are cognizable, just as it occurs for horizontal 
mergers.  These effects would be included in a full competitive effects analysis, but not in a 
proxy concentration measure used for a safe harbor screen or an anticompetitive presumption.  
This is the approach in the HMGs, even though it commonly is said that many horizontal 
mergers also generate efficiency benefits.   
Fifth, the first-round effects in equation (1) do not account for the possibility of any input 
substitution by the targeted downstream rivals, whereby the targeted rivals would reduce input 
purchases from the merged firm and increase input purchases from upstream rivals of the merged 
firm.  Nor do they account for accommodating responses by those upstream competitors, 
whereby the upstream competitors also would increase the input prices charged to the targeted 
downstream firms.  However, as we discuss below, equation (1) would remain a good 
approximation if input substitution were possible and the competitors of the upstream merging 
firm would respond to the increase in demand for their inputs by matching the upstream merging 
firm’s price increases.  The input substitution tends to reduce the upstream merging firm’s 
incentive to raise its input prices to targeted downstream rivals, which tends to reduce the 
increase in the marginal cost of the targeted rivals, and hence reduces the targeted rivals’ 
incentives to raise their output price.  At the same time, the accommodating input price increases 
by upstream competitors tend to increase the targeted rivals’ marginal costs, which in turn tends 
to increase their incentives to raise output prices to consumers.  The combined assumptions of no 
input substitution and no accommodating price responses by upstream rivals is the simplest case 
to analyze for the dHHI. 
B. Input Substitution  
Our derivation of the dHHI assumes that the downstream rivals targeted for input price increases 
by the upstream merging firm are unable to substitute the input of the upstream merging firm 
with inputs supplied by other upstream firms.  We have made this assumption for several 
reasons.   
First, it substantially simplifies the data requirements and calculations.  For the dHHI, the analyst 
needs the following data: the upstream cost pass-through rate (PTRU), the market share of the 
downstream merging firm (SD), the total market share of the foreclosed downstream rivals (SF) 




of the rival’s input purchases (SUR), the input price paid to the upstream merging firm by the rival 
(WUR), the percentage margin earned by the upstream merging firm on input sales to the rival 
(MUR), and the percentage margin (MR) and output price (PR) of the rival.  These data often are 
readily available.    
Our vGUPPI article explains how the vGUPPIs are altered when there is input substitution and 
describes the additional data requirements.38  The dHHI also would require data on the 
downstream pass-through elasticity (EP), which might not be so difficult to estimate.39  However, 
the dHHI calculation also would require an estimate of the “elasticity of substitution” (ESR), 
which can be difficult to estimate precisely.40  The estimation of this elasticity might require a 
full study of the input market.41     
In fact, the study of upstream competition would need to go even further.  When there is no input 
substitution, the focus on first-round effects and the assumption that upstream competitors’ 
prices are constant do not create any distortion.  When there is input substitution, the vGUPPIr, 
mGUPPIr and dHHI would be lower, if it is assumed that the upstream competitors’ prices do 
not change.  However, a more reliable analysis should recognize that input substitution increases 
the demand faced by upstream rivals, and thus upstream rivals may have an incentive to raise 
their prices in response to the price increase by the upstream merging firm.  Taking these likely 
reactions into account would require a more complex analysis of upstream competition.  The role 
of the dHHI calculation is to provide a rough indicator, not to capture all the complexities of 
competition.  If the agencies decide to investigate the merger further, those complexities could be 
analyzed using simulation models, econometrics, analysis of business strategy documents, and so 
on.  The accommodating response by upstream competitors may be predicted to be larger if the 
upstream market is more concentrated, if the inputs are less differentiated or if the suppliers have 
rising marginal costs.  
Second, if the dHHI were used as part of a safe harbor for vertical mergers involving input 
foreclosure concerns, a conservative approach to the dHHI should be taken.  If the upstream 
competitors were to match the input price increases of the upstream merging firm, that likely 
would completely offset the effects of input substitution, and hence input substitution would not 
                                                 
38 Moresi & Salop, supra note 4, at 202–204.  
39 EP denotes the elasticity of the price of the targeted rival (PR) with respect to an increase in the input 
price that the rival must pay to the upstream merging firm (WUR). 
40 ESR denotes the elasticity of the upstream merging firm’s share of the rival’s input purchases (SUR) with 
respect to an increase in the input price that the rival must pay to the upstream merging firm (WUR). 
41 Our vGUPPI article provides a method for “calibrating” the values of EP and ESR, but this requires 
assuming pre-merger symmetric downstream firms and obtaining estimates for the downstream cost pass-
through rate (PTRR) and the aggregate price elasticity of downstream market demand (E).  Moresi & 
Salop, supra note 4, at 205.  In addition, the calibration of EP can be more complicated when there are 





occur.  If instead the upstream rivals would not fully match, then there would be some input 
substitution and that would tend to reduce the dHHI depending on the elasticity of substitution 
and the extent of partial price matching.  The dHHI that we have proposed (assuming no input 
substitution and no responses by upstream rivals) likely is a good approximation for the case 
with both input substitution and responses from upstream rivals.  While one cannot claim that 
there would be full price matching by upstream rivals and hence no input substitution, that 
assumption is the conservative one.42  The assumption of full matching also might suggest a 
conservative approach to any anticompetitive presumption based solely on the dHHI (and 
associated post-merger HHI). 
V. The vGUPPI Methodology, Feedback Effects, and Simultaneous vGUPPIs 
Preliminary analysis of vertical mergers involving input foreclosure concerns might focus 
directly on the vGUPPIs themselves rather than using the partial ownership dHHI proxy that is 
based on the vGUPPIs.  If there is no input substitution, these vGUPPIs are relatively simple to 
calculate, as shown above in equations (1) and (3).    
Two recent working papers have suggested that the vGUPPI methodology is not useful because 
the vGUPPIu always predicts that the merged firm will have an incentive to raise rivals’ costs, 
but a simulation model that takes into account the existence of merger-specific EDM may predict 
that the merged firm actually will decrease the input price that it charges to downstream rivals.43  
These papers also have suggested that vGUPPIr is similarly a poor proxy for the downstream 
effects in the presence of merger-specific EDM, because vGUPPIr always predicts that the 
foreclosed rivals will have an incentive to raise price, when there are in fact situations where a 
simulation model predicts that rivals will be foreclosed and yet will reduce prices to consumers.   
A. Explaining the Feedback Effects 
We did not intend to give the impression that each of the simple vGUPPIs derived in our article 
should be examined in a vacuum when there is merger-specific EDM.  We reported several 
vGUPPId measures: vGUPPId1 does not take EDM into account because merger-specific EDM 
may not occur; vGUPPId2 takes merger-specific EDM into account and may be negative; and 
vGUPPId3 takes EDM into account and assumes further efficiencies from input substitution.44  
                                                 
42 In addition, all the potentially foreclosed firms should be included in the analysis. 
43 Gopal Das Varma & Martino De Stefano, Equilibrium Analysis of Vertical Mergers (Dec. 10, 2018), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3307150 (“Under certain commonly used assumptions, a vertical merger 
may even create an incentive for the merged firm to lower its rivals’ cost.”); Gleb Domnenko & David S. 
Sibley, Simulating Vertical Mergers and the Vertical GUPPI Approach (Jan. 1, 2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3447687 (“In the simulations, the upstream price 
paid by the remaining downstream rival can either rise or fall.”).  





Merger-specific EDM can mitigate the UPP or even offset it.  To account for these feedback 
effects, we suggested that a full simulation model could be estimated and run.45  The two 
working papers discussed here took the simulation approach and compared their results with the 
simple vGUPPIs when there is significant merger-specific EDM.  
The situations where vGUPPIu and vGUPPIr do not perform well in the simulation models (in 
the sense that they have the wrong sign) can be explained and accounted for in a very simple 
way.     
First, those studies consider situations where EDM is relatively large.  When merger-specific 
EDM is relatively small, vGUPPIu and vGUPPIr perform well.  In fact, in the absence of any 
merger-specific EDM, the vGUPPId1 is positive.  In this situation, the vGUPPId1 reinforces the 
upward pricing pressure from the vGUPPIr or vGUPPu.    
Second, the price reductions found in the two working papers are not surprising.  It is clear that 
the vGUPPIs gauge only first-round effects and do not take into account pricing feedback effects 
between the two merging firms.46  When merger-specific EDM is relatively large, feedback 
effects can be important and should be taken into account.  It also is clear that the net effect can 
be to reduce all prices paid by downstream rivals and consumers, if merger-specific EDM is 
large enough.47  
Third, in our vGUPPI article, we suggested that the weighted average of the (negative) 
vGUPPId2 and the (positive) vGUPPIr might be a rough way to gauge the offsetting effects.  
(vGUPPId2 is the vGUPPId measure in our article that accounts for the basic EDM.)  Our 
further analysis shows that it actually is straightforward to account for feedback effects between 
the pricing incentives of the two merging firms.  This involves simultaneously adjusting the 
vGUPPIu of the upstream merging firm and the vGUPPId2 of the downstream merging firm to 
account for the feedback effects.  We call these adjusted vGUPPIs the “simultaneous vGUPPIu” 
and “simultaneous vGUPPId2,” and denote them by “SvGUPPIu” and “SvGUPPId2” 
respectively.  They are derived in the same way as the simultaneous GUPPIs for horizontal 
mergers.48  The simultaneous vGUPPIs can be used to account for the feedback effect of merger-
specific EDM (vGUPPId2) on input foreclosure incentives (vGUPPIu).  
                                                 
45 Id. at n.39. 
46 Id. at 190.  
47 See Shihua Lu, Serge Moresi & Steven C. Salop, A Note on Vertical Mergers with an Upstream 
Monopolist: Foreclosure and Consumer Welfare Effects, (June 2007), 
https://www.crai.com/sites/default/files/publications/Merging-with-an-upstream-monopolist.pdf.  This 
earlier unpublished article used a linear demand model and was a building block for the two working 
papers. 




B. Simultaneous vGUPPIs 
We turn next to the derivation of these simultaneous vGUPPIs.  Consider the model used in two 
working papers: a monopolist upstream supplier (U) sells inputs to two downstream 
manufacturers (D and R) and wants to merge with D.  The SvGUPPIu and SvGUPPId2 are 
expressed as a percentage of price and are given by the following system of two equations:  
	 	 		 	 	 	 2 	 	  (8) 
2	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (9) 
where MUD and WUD denote the percentage margin and input price of the upstream merging firm 
U for input sales to the downstream merging firm D in the pre-merger market.  Note that, if we 
set SvGUPPId2 = 0 in equation (8), then equation (8) reduces to the simple vGUPPIu of our 
article.  Similarly, if we set SvGUPPIu = 0 in equation (9), then equation (9) reduces to the 
simple vGUPPId2 of our article.  The presence of the two vGUPPIs in both equations (8) and (9) 
captures the feedback effects.   
Solving equations (8) and (9) simultaneously for SvGUPPIu and SvGUPPId2 yields the 
following simultaneous vGUPPIs, which have the form of a weighted sum of the simple 
vGUPPIu and vGUPPId2: 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 2	 	 	  (10) 
2	 	 	 	 	 2	 	 	 	 	 	 	  (11) 
where Z = 1 / (1 - DRRD × DRDR) is a scale factor that exceeds unity.  Equations (10) and (11) 
show how to obtain the simultaneous vGUPPIs that account for feedback effects between the 
merging firm’s incentives using the simple vGUPPIs provided in our vGUPPI article (which do 
not account for feedback effects).   
To see the impact of the feedback effects, note that in equation (10) the simultaneity leads to 
SvGUPPIu > vGUPPIu when vGUPPId2 = 0.  This is because vGUPPId2 is first-round and thus 
implicitly assumes vGUPPIu = 0.  But since vGUPPIu > 0, we see from equation (11) that  




vGUPPIu (when vGUPPId2 = 0).  Intuitively, even if there is no first-round effect on the pricing 
incentives of the downstream merging firm, there will be a second-round effect because of the 
first-round effect on the pricing incentives of the upstream merging firm, which will then lead to 
a second-round effect on the pricing incentives of the upstream merging firm, and so on.49  
The two working papers consider situations in which the simple vGUPPId2 is negative and 
relatively large, so that it is possible that the simultaneous vGUPPIu in equation (10) turns 
negative.50  If EDM is large and merger-specific, then we agree that a full competitive effects 
analysis must account for the interaction of the upward and downward pricing pressure.  The 
above simultaneous vGUPPIs attempt to account for that interaction.  By contrast, the simple 
vGUPPIs are not intended to serve as a complete competitive effects analysis because they only 
capture first-round effects.51        
It is the case that vGUPPIu can turn negative when EDM is merger-specific and relatively large.  
However, we caution that the presence of large merger-specific EDM is not inevitable and 
cannot be assumed on faith.52  Indeed, a recent article reported empirical evidence from a large 
database of vertically integrated firms that indicated that there were no internal input transfers 
from the upstream division to the downstream division in about half of all the vertically-
integrated firms studied.53  And there are numerous reasons why EDM would not occur even 
when there are internal transfers of inputs.54    
In addition, the two working papers assume that the upstream merging firm is a monopolist in 
order to focus most simply on the feedback effects when EDM is large.  In a non-monopoly 
scenario, the upstream merging firm would face competition and that affects the analysis.  
Upstream competition reduces the pre-merger equilibrium upstream margin below the monopoly 
level, and a lower upstream margin implies that a vertical merger leads to smaller EDM.  In a full 
                                                 
49 Similarly, when vGUPPIu = 0 in equation (11), the simultaneity leads to |SvGUPPId2| > |vGUPPId2|.  
This is because vGUPPIu is first-round and thus implicitly assumes vGUPPId2 = 0.  But if vGUPPId2 < 
0, we see from equation (10) that  SvGUPPIu < 0 (when vGUPPIu = 0) and hence it follows from 
equation (9) that |SvGUPPId2| > |vGUPPId2| (when vGUPPIu = 0). 
50 The two studies compare simulation results with the simple vGUPPIs, not with the simultaneous 
vGUPPIs.  We are not suggesting that the simultaneous vGUPPIs always would have been much closer to 
the simulation results than the simple vGUPPIs.  But they are an easy step in the right direction.  
51 Moresi & Salop, supra note 4 at 190.  
52 For example, with secret contracting and non-linear input prices, there is no EDM because pre-merger 
suppliers set marginal prices equal to marginal costs.  Rey & Vergé, supra note 6, at 68–69.  
53 See Enghin Atalay, Ali Hortaçsu & Chad Syverson, Vertical Integration and Input Flows, 104 AM. 
ECON. REV. 1120, 1127 (2014). 
54 See Jonathan B. Baker, Nancy L. Rose, Steven C. Salop & Fiona Scott Morton, Recommendations and 
Comments on the Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines (February 24, 2020); John Kwoka & Margaret Slade, 





simulation model for the non-monopoly scenario with input substitution, and where the upstream 
competitors have the incentive to accommodate post-merger changes in the input price charged 
by the merged firm, the overall results also could differ substantially.  A model of a monopoly 
supplier is not the best model to guide vertical merger policy. 
VI. Conclusions  
The dHHI shows that vertical mergers involving input foreclosure concerns have an analogue to 
horizontal consolidation in the downstream market.  This is a significant result because it shows 
that there is not the type of inherent difference in the effects of vertical and horizonal mergers 
that is sometimes claimed.  At the same time, we do not want to overclaim that the use the dHHI 
and the resulting post-merger HHI is an airtight gauge of the likely impact of vertical mergers 
that raise input foreclosure concerns.  As we have stressed in this comment, the dHHI gauges 
only first-round effects and only for unilateral input foreclosure.  The same point applies to 
analysis directly based on the levels of the vGUPPIs.  However, we are confident that using the 
HHI either alone or in conjunction with our dHHI approach would provide a better gauge than 
the 20% safe harbor market share threshold in the draft VMGs.55  Therefore, we believe that the 
dHHI approach should be investigated further.    
 
 
                                                 
55 Draft VMGs, supra note 3, at 3. 
